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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF SPEECH - OBSCENITY 1958-1960*
Introduction
The problem of obscenity, as has been indicated by developments in the past
two years, is one which concerns both local and federal government as well as
religious and social groups. As might be expected, in an area which involves a
delicate balancing of the public interest in free speech with the public interest in
the moral fabric of society, there has been a wide divergence of views, not only
as to what action should be taken in the case of obscene literature or motion pic-
tures but also as to whether or not a particular book, picture or pamphlet is actually
obscene. It is the purpose of this section of the Religious Institutions and Values
Survey to examine the legal developments in this field since 1958. Among the
more important problem areas which will be discussed are whether obscene publica-
tions are constitutionally protected, the problem of prior restraint, the question of
measures which may be taken to protect youth from material which, although not
likely to be morally detrimental to adults, might quite possibly have a deleterious
effect upon youth, and the question of who shall decide what is and what is not
obscene.
The Free Speech Issue
It was not until Roth v. United States' in 1957 that obscenity was held by the
Supreme Court of the United States to be not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech and press. While the Court in earlier cases had reviewed obscenity
convictions, the direct question of whether or not the First and Fourteenth
Amendments protected obscene material by guaranteeing the freedom of the press
and freedom of speech against governmental infringement had never been directly
passed upon. 2 However, some of these earlier cases did contain dicta to the effect
that obscenity was not entitled to the protection of the Constitution.3
The Roth case was actually a review of two lower court cases. In United States
v. Roth4 the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction of a businessman engaged in
the publication and sale of books, photographs and magazines on an indictment
charging him with mailing obscene circulars and advertising, and an obscene book,
in violation of the federal obscenity statute.5 The defendant contended inter alia
* Final installment in THE LAwYER's 1960 Religious Institutions and Values Survey.
1 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2 See cases cited id., at 481, n. 9.
3 See cases cited id., at 481.
4 237 F.2d 796 (2nd Cir. 1956).
5 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper,
letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character; and-
Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertise-
ment, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly,
where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any such mentioned mat-
ters, articles, or things may be obtained or made, . . . whether sealed or
unsealed . . .
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the
mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, anything declared
by this section to be nonmailable, or knowingly takes the same from the
mails for the purpose of circulating or disposing thereof, or of aiding in the
circulation or disposition thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both ....
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that the provisions of this statute violated the provision of the First Amendment
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... "6 In People v. Alberts7 the defendant, who conducted a mail-order
business, was convicted under a complaint charging him with keeping for sale
obscene and indecent books, and with writing, composing and publishing an obscene
advertisement of them, in violation of the California Penal Code." The defendant
contended that the applicable provisions of the California statute infringed the
freedoms of speech and press as incorporated in the liberty protected from state
action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed both convictions. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing
for the court, declared that "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is
the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."' 01 Mr.
Justice Harlan concurred in the Albert's result, but dissented from the Roth holding
and declared that the substantive powers of the federal government did not include
the power to regulate and control obscenity." Mr. Justice Douglas, with the con-
currence of Mr. Justice Black, dissented declaring he would give the First Amend-
ment the sweep of its absolute terms and that he would not create an exception
to permit the censorship of allegedly obscene literature.' 2 He remarked:
[I]f the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and press is to
mean anything in this field, it must allow protests even against the moral
code that the standard of the day sets for the community....
The legality of a publication in this country should never be allowed
to turn either on the purity of thought which it instills in the mind of the
reader or on the degree to which it offends the community conscience.
By either test the role of the censor is exalted, and society's values in literary
freedom are sacrificed."3
Despite the broad declaration by the majority in Roth that obscenity was not
constitutionally protected, other intriguing questions involving the measures which
might be taken to suppress obscene literature without violating the First Amend-
ment remained to be decided. It was, for example, not until the decision in Smith
v. People'4 that the Supreme Court declared that the element of scienter, i.e.,
knowledge by a bookseller of the obscene contents of a book-could not be ignored.' 5
The Court, in striking down a conviction under a Los Angeles ordinance 6 imposing
strict criminal liability on a bookseller in whose possession there was found obscene
6 U. S. CONST. amend. I.
7 138 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 909, 292 P.2d 90 (1955).
8 Every person who wilfully and lewdly, either ...
3. Writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, distributes, keeps
for sale, or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, or book; or
designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints or otherwise prepares any obscene
or indecent picture or print; or molds, cuts, casts, or otherwise makes any
obscene or indecent figure; or,
4. Writes, composes, or publishes any notice or advertisement of any such
writing, paper, book, picture, print or figure . . .
6. . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor .... CAL. PEN. CODE, § 311.
9 U. S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
10 354 U.S. at 484.
11 Id. at 496-508.
12 Id. at 508-14.
13 Id. at 513.
14 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
15 People v. Shapiro, 177 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1958) held that scienter was not required.
But Moens v. United States, 267 Fed. 317 (D.C. 1920) required knowledge; and see cases
cited in Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 396 Pa. 417, 153 A.2d 227, 228 (1959). A.L.I.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207. 10 (7) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957).
16 Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 41.01.1:
INDECENT WRITING, ETC. - POSSESSION PROHIBITED: It
shall be unlawful for any person to have in his possession any obscene or
indecent writing, book, pamphlet, picture, photograph, drawing, figure,
motion picture film, phonograph recording, wire recording or transcrip-
tion of any kind ....
NOTES
material, did so on the ground that such an ordinance might "tend to work a sub-
stantial restriction on freedom of speech." The Court reasoned:
By dispensing with any requirement of knowledge of the contents of the
books on the part of the seller, the ordinance tends to impose a severe
limitation on the public's access to constitutionally protected matter. For
if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents,
and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to restrict the book he
sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a
restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as
obscene literature.... The bookseller's limitation in the amount of reading
material with which he could familiarize himself, and his timidity in the
face of his absolute criminal liability, thus would tend to restrict the
public's access to forms of the printed word which the State could not
constitutionally suppress directly. The bookseller's self-censorship, com-
pelled by the State, would be a censorship affecting the whole public, hardly
less virulent for being privately administered. Through it, the distribution
of all books, both obscene and not obscene, would be impeded."'37
Smith, by ruling out the possibility of imposing strict criminal liability upon those
selling obscene literature, raises interesting problems in regard to the enforcement
of "obscenity" statutes. The Court left undecided the question of "How much
or how little awareness that a book may be found to be obscene suffices to establish
scienter, or what kind of evidence may satisfy the how much or the how little.... "8
The problem of proof in Smith invites speculation on the constitutionality of a
provision recommended by the American Law Institute in the obscenity section of
the Model Penal Code. This provision requires scienter but creates a rebuttable
presumption that a person who disseminates obscene material knows of the existence
of those portions of the material which render it obscene. 9 The majority in Smith,
in referring to the problem of proof, declared:
Eyewitness testimony of a bookseller's perusal of a book hardly need
be a necessary element in providing his awareness of its contents. The
circumstances may warrant the inference that he was aware of what a book
contained, despite his denial.
We need not and most definitely do not pass today on what sort of
mental element is requisite to a constitutionally permissible prosecution of
a bookseller for carrying an obscene book in stock; whether honest mistake
as to whether its contents in fact constituted obscenity need be an excuse;
whether there might be circumstances under which the State constitutionally
might require that a bookseller investigate further, or might put on him
the burden of explaining why he did not, and what such circumstances
might be (Italics added). 2o
In this regard it is interesting to note that the majority in Smith referred to the
Model Code provision in a footnote which declared: "Common law requirements
for the dissemination of obscene matter strictly adhered to the requirement of
scienter.""2 This might indicate approval of the Model Code provision.
Another free speech question which has not yet been definitively settled by
the Supreme Court is whether or not the Constitution permits prior restraint
of obscene material. In Near v. Minnesota22 the Supreme Court barred as uncon-
stitutional the granting of a permanent injunction against the publication of a
newspaper found to be scandalous and defamatory. The Minnesota courts had
upheld such an injunction granted under the provisions of a Minnesota statute.23
The court held that such an injunction was an unconstitutional restraint upon the
17 361 U.S. at 153-54.
18 Id. at 161.
19 "A person who disseminates obscenity or who with purpose to disseminate creates,
buys, possesses or procures obscenity is presumed to know the existence of those parts, features
or contents of the material which render it obscene." A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(7)
(Tentative Draft, No. 6, 1957).
20 361 U.S. at 154.
21 Id. at 153, n. 9.
22 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
23 MINN. SEss. LAws 1925, ch. 205 § 1:
Any person who . . . shall be engaged in the business of regularly or cus-
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the court
was careful to point out:
[T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely un-
limited. But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases....
The primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene
publications.
24
This dictum from Near was relied upon by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his opinion
for the court in Kingsley v. Brown25 which held that a New York statute 6 authoriz-
ing an injunction pendente lite against the sale and distribution of allegedly obscene
material did not violate constitutional safeguards. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
declared that the phrase "prior restraint" was not a "self-wielding sword."
He distinguished Near upon the dual grounds that: (1) Minnesota had
empowered its courts to enjoin the dissemination of future issues of a publication
because its past issues had been found to be offensive, whereas in the instant case
tomarily producing, publishing or circulating, having in possession, selling
or giving away
(b) a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other peri-
odical is guilty of a nuisance . .. may be enjoined.
24 283 U.S. at 716.
25 Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
26 N.Y. Cam. PRoc. § 22-a
Obscene prints and articles; jurisdiction. The supreme court has jurisdic-
tion to enjoin the sale or distribution of obscene prints or articles, as herein-
after specified:
1. The chief executive officer of any city, town or village or the corpora-
tion counsel, or if there be none, the chief legal officer of any city, town, or
village, in which a person, firm or corporation sells or distributes or is about
to sell or distribute or has in his possession with intent to sell or distribute
or is about to acquire possession with intent to sell or distribute any book,
magazine, pamphlet, comic book, story paper, writing, paper, picture,
drawing, photograph, figure, image or any written or printed matter of an
indecent character, which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or
disgusting, or which contains an article or instrument of indecent or im-
moral use or purports to be for indecent or immoral use or purpose; or in
any other respect defined in section eleven hundred forty-one of the penal
law, may maintain an action for an injunction against such person, firm
or corporation in the supreme court to prevent the sale or further sale or
the distribution or further distribution or the acquisition or possession of
any book, magazine, pamphlet, comic book, story paper, writing, paper,
picture, drawing, photograph, figure or image or any written or printed
matter of an indecent character, herein described or described in section
eleven hundred forty-one of the penal law.
2. The person, firm or corporation sought to be enjoined shall be entitled
to a trial of the issues within one day after joinder of issue and a decision
shall be rendered by the court within two days of the conclusion of the trial.
3. In the event that a final order or judgment of injunction be entered
in favor of such officer of the city, town, or village and against the person,
firm or corporation sought to be enjoined, such final order of judgment
shall contain a provision directing the person, firm or corporation to sur-
render to the sheriff of the county in which the action was brought any of
the matter described in paragraph one hereof and such sheriff shall be
directed to seize and destroy the same.
4. In any action brought as herein provided such officer of the city, town
or village shall not be required to file any undertaking before the issuance
of an injunction order provided for in paragraph two hereof, shall not
be liable for costs and shall not be liable for damages sustained by reason
of the injunction order in cases where judgment is rendered in favor of the
person, firm or corporation sought to be enjoined.
5. Every person, firm or corporation who sells, distributes, or acquires
possession with intent to sell or distribute any of the matter described in
paragraph one hereof, after the service upon him of a summons or com-
plaint in an action brought by such officer of any city, town, or village
pursuant to this section is chargeable with knowledge of the contents
thereof.
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the courts had enjoined only the future dissemination of a particular publication
alleged to be obscene pending a trial upon the issues.
(2) Near involved not obscenity but matter found to be derogatory to a public
officer. The fact that the Kingsley decision was by a five to four margin has led
one commentator to express the "hope" that this decision is not the Supreme
Court's last word on the subjectY.2 Mr. Chief Justice Warren dissented on the ground
that the manner of use should determine obscenity and, therefore, the conduct of
the individual defendant, rather than the quality of art or literature, should be
tried. Justices Black and Douglas found an encroachment upon First Amendment
freedoms, and Mr. Justice Brennan found a fatal defect in the failure of the
obscenity statute to provide for a right to trial by jury. What is needed in the
area of "prior restraint" is a clearer determination of the meaning of the term.
It would seem that it should be restricted to the type of thing which was involved
in Near, i.e., prohibition of the mere publication of future materials, and should
not be extended to include the activities which were involved in Kingsley v. Brown.
In the light of Roth, the decision in Kingsley seems warranted. The law should
enjoin the distribution of books which have been published, and deemed obscene
after such publication and judicial proceedings based upon full knowledge of the
material in question. If the definition is so restricted, it will become possible to say,
categorically, that "prior restraint" is not permitted by the First Amendment.
Thus far the cases which we have considered dealt with problems of obscene
literature. It has been suggested that motion pictures may require a different treat-
ment.2 8 First Amendment protection was at first denied to motion pictures because
the exhibition of film was a business conducted solely for profit.2 9 However, this
position was progressively modified,30 until, in 1952, the Supreme Court, in the
Burstyn case,31 held motion pictures to be within the protection of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. In Burstyn a state was not permitted to ban a picture
found to be "sacrilegeous." Since this decision state cases banning motion pictures
have been summarily reversed,32 but neither the per curiam reversals nor the
Burstyn decision decided that a state may not censor or license motion pictures found
to be obscene.33 In view of the ruling in the literature cases, that obscenity is not
within the protection of the First Amendment, and the testing of motion picture
cases by the Roth definition of obscenity, 4 it would seem that obscene motion pic-
tures are no greater protection than obscene literature.35
27 PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoN 411 (1959).
28 If there be a capacity for evil [in the motion picture] it may be relevant
in determining' the permissible scope of community control.... Nor does
it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules
governing any other particular method of expression. Each method tends to
present its own particular problems. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952).
29 Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commissioner of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
30 U.S. v. Paramount Picture, 343 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (dictum): "We have no doubt
that moving pictures like newspapers and radios, are included in the press whose freedom
is guaranteed by the First Amendment."
31 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
32 Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957); Holmby Production Inc. v. Vaugn,
350 U.S. 870 (1955); Superior Films v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954);
Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
33 In reversing the latest motion picture case the Court carefully pointed out that the
state court had "unanimously and explicitly rejected any notion that the film is obscene,"
and cited Roth. Kingsley Int. Pic. Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 686 (1959).
34 Roth was cited in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957) and again in
Kingsley Int. Pic. Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). But see Commonwealth v. Blumen-
stein, 396 Pa. 417, 153 A.2d 227 (1959) which appeared to disregard much of the language
approved in Roth.
35 FRAENKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 33-35 (1960). In Times Film
Corp. v. Chicago, 272 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1959), the pleadings were framed in such a manner
as to force the court to answer the question whether a motion picture licensing status was
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A Definition and Its Application
The need for a definition of obscenity which sets up fairly definite standards
that may reasonably be relied upon as a guide for future conduct is twofold. First,
the due process clause requires such a definition as a prerequisite for the imposition
of criminal liability.3 6 Secondly, since the Supreme Court has held that "obscenity"
is not protected by the free speech and press guarantees of the Constitution, the
courts have need of such a definition to guide them in determining whether or
not these constitutional guarantees may be invoked in each particular factual
situation.
It was not until the decision in Regina v. Hicklin37 in 1868 that a common
law court attempted to enunciate a test for obscenity. The court there announced
the test as being: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and
into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."' 8 As this test was subsequently
applied it became one under which isolated and distinct passages of a publication
could be the basis for a finding of "obscenity," and depended only on the court's be-
lief that the publication was capable of reaching a hypothetical person to whom it
might be morally harmful.3 9 This "isolated passage" application of the Hicklin
doctrine was subsequently repudiated in United States v. One Book Entitled
Ulysses, 40 where the Second Circuit declared that "the proper test of whether a
given book is obscene is its dominant effect." 41 (Italics supplied).
This was the state of the law when the Supreme Court in Roth v. United
States,42 in addition to answering the question of whether or not obscenity was
protected by the Constitution, supplied a new definition of obscenity. The Court
declared the proper test to be: "whether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interests."
4'
The Court elaborated upon what was meant by "prurient interest" by referring
44
to the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code which provides:
... A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation of such matters .... 45
In the recenty "Lady Chatterley's Lover" movie case,46 the Supreme Court
pointed out that this definition of "obscenity" does not encompass the advocacy of
ideas, however unpopular or unconventional they may be. The picture in question
had "struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty," namely, the
and proper pattern of behavior. The Court stated 4 that New York had ruled that
the picture was not obscene48 and declared that the State, in banning the picture
constitutional. The Seventh Circuit refused to answer, labelling the issue "abstract." Certiorari
has been granted. 80 Sup. Ct. 672 (1960).
36 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); see FRAENKEL, TnE SUPREME COURT
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 63-64 (1960).
37 L.R., 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
38 Id. at 371.
39 See U.S. v. Rosen, 161 U.S. 29 (1895).
40 72 F.2d 705 (2nd Cir. 1934), affirming 5 F.Supp. 182 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
41 Id. at 708.
42 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
43 Id. at 489. The Hicklin rule was discarded by the court as being now "unconsti-
tutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press."
44 Id. at 487, note 20.
45 A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2). (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957).
46 Kingsley Int. Pic. Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
47 360 U.S. at 686.
48 Whether the New York court did so rule is open to question. See the decision by
Judge Conway in Kingsley Int. Pic. Corp. v. Regents, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39, 151 N.E.2d 197
(1958).
But see Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), where a
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had "struck" at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty," namely, the
freedom to advocate ideas. 49 The plain implication of this decision is that it is the
manner of portrayal, rather than the ideas portrayed, which controls the legal defi-
nition of obscenity.
Despite this clarification of the definition of obscenity there remain problems
in regard to the application of the definition to particular classes of situations. One
of these problem areas concerns material which, though it could be found to be
obscene in relation to the average man in the community, serves a valid literary
or educational purpose as to certain groups. Although the Supreme Court in Roth
quoted with seeming approval the following portion of the trial judge's charge to
the jury- " . . . The test is not whether it ... would leave another segment, the
scientific or highly educated or the so-called worldly-wise and sophisticated indif-
ferent and umnoved .... "51 - at least one lower federal court has indicated that
the average person in the community test does not apply where the material alleged
to be obscene is destined for the hands of a group with a valid non-prurient in-
terest.52 In this case, which was decided not long after Roth, the government sought
the confiscation and destruction of certain photographs, books, and other articles
under the provisions of the Tariff Act of 1938.53 The materials, which the court
assumed to be pure pornography without any literary merit, had been imported
by the Institute for Sex Research, Inc., at Indiana University for the purpose of
furthering its study of human sexual behavior. The court, in refusing to allow the
government to impound it the data, held that because of the limited audience
which would have access to the material, the average-man-in-the-community test
was inapplicable. Such a test, the court declared, was applicable only where the
material was to be distributed to the public. Viewed in this light, the court re-
marked that the average man test was but a particular application of a broader
rule which judges the material by its appeal to all those it is likely to reach.5 4
The court noted the argument of the government that such a decision would render
the prohibition of the Tariff Act unworkable but replied that it failed "to see why
it should be more difficult to determine the appeal of the libelled matter to a
known group of persons than it is to determine its appeal to an hypothetical 'average
man.' 25
A somewhat related question arises in regard to legislation enacted to prevent
the dissemination of material which, although not obscene under the average man
test, is dangerous to children. 6 The Supreme Court has considered the question
of general restrictions, but it has not directly ruled upon the validity of a restriction
limited to children. In Butler v. Michigan7 the Court held that a Michigan
federal district court lifted a ban which had been placed upon the mailing of the book, "Lady
Chatterley's Lover," by the Postmaster General. The court specifically held that the book
did not come within the meaning of obscenity as used in the federal obscenity statute.
49 360 U.S. at 688.
50 See Id. at 688: "Rather the New York Court of Appeals tells us that the relevant
portion of the New York Education Law requires the denial of a license to any motion picture
which approvingly portrays an adulterous relationship, quite without reference to the manner
of its portrayal." (Italics added).
51 354 U.S. at 490.
52 United States v. 31 Photos, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
53 46 Stat. 688 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1958).
54 As an alternate ground for its decision the court noted the possibility of holding
that a conditional privilege existed in favor of scientists and scholars to import material which
would be obscene in the hands of the average person. 156 F. Supp. at 358. Compare A.L.I.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(4) (b) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957), exempting a "dis-
semination to institutions or individuals having scientific or other special justification for pos-
sessing such material."
55 156 F. Supp. at 359.
56 See Note, "For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental Film Censorship
by Age Classification," 69 Yale L.J. 141 (1959) for an excellent analysis.
57 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
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statute" which made it a crime to distribute to the general public material which
was morally detrimental to minors violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion for the court, declared: "We
have before us legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said
to deal. The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of
Michigan to reading only what is fit for children."5 9 A natural implication of this
language may be that if the legislation had been reasonably restricted to the evil,
i.e., if it had merely provided for punishment in cases of distribution to minors, it
would have been constitutional. This interpretation is given added weight by the
Court's reference to the fact that the conviction was not under an available statute
which specifically made criminal the distribution of obscene material to minors.60
There is language in the Roth case which might appear to indicate a contrary
result. In referring to the "average man in the community" test, the majority
approved the trial judge's instruction that: "The test is not whether it would
arouse sexual desires or sexual impure thoughts in those comprising a particular
segment of the community, the young, the immature or the highly prudish .... "61
However, it again should be noted that the court was there dealing with a question
of general censorship rather than a limited restriction upon distribution.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island recently has upheld the constitutionality
of a statute 2 which prohibits the distribution of obscene publications to persons
under eighteen years of age. 63 The Court distinguished the Butler case on the
ground that the Michigan statute there involved did not limit its prohibition to
sales to minors.64 However, the court did not indicate whether it was applying a
special test of obscenity or whether the material in question satisfied the average-
man-in-the-community test. A system of limited censorship of motion pictures
directed to the protection of minors was held unconstitutional in Paramount Film
Distributing Corporation v. City of Chicago;"5 the court expressly rejected a test
of obscenity which was based upon the effect of the movie in question upon the
average person twenty-one years of age. Petitioner had been granted only a limited
license to show the film, "Desire Under the Elms," to persons over twenty-one,
pursuant to the provisions of an ordinance of the City of Chicago.66 The federal
district court held the ordinance to be unconstitutional, resting its decision upon
three grounds: (1) a motion picture cannot be obscene as to juveniles and not as
58 MICH. STAT. ANN. ch. 286a § 28.575 (1954), repealed by Pub. Acts 1957, No. 265.
59 352 U.S. at 383. See also Goldstein v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 25, 104 S.E.2d 66
(1958), in which a Virginia statute, similar to that of Michigan, was held unconstitutional on
the basis of Butler. Nevertheless, one lower New York Court without discussing the implica-
tions of Butler, has sustained a conviction under a statute prohibiting the general distribution
of obscene literature where it was found that the normal distribution of the magazine would
place it in the hands of youth. Noting that the statute did not make fitness for youths' reading
the test for all literature, the court declared "it cannot be supposed that the legislature in-
tended to give youth less protection than the community as a whole by the general proscription
of that which is obscene." People v. Richmond County News Inc. 13 Misc.2d 1068, 179
N.Y.S.2d 76, 81 (1958).
60 352 U.S. at 383, referring to MIcir. STAT. ANN. ch. 286a § 28.337 (1938).
61 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S., at 490 (1957).
62 R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. 11-31-10 (1956).
63 State v. Settle, 156 A.2d 921 (R.I. 1959).
64 Id. at 926. Cf. Katzev v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal.2d 360, 341 P.2d 310 (1959);
Adams v. Hinkle, 51 W.2d 763, 322 P.2d 844 (1958). The laws struck down here applied
broadly to all comic books regardless of their content.
65 172 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
66 CHICAGo, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODF § 155-5 (1939) this code provides in pertinent part:
In all cases where a permit for the exhibition of a picture . . . has been
refused . .. because the same tends toward creating a harmful impression
on the minds of children, where such tendency as to the minds of adults
would not exist if exhibited only to persons of mature age, the commissioner
of police may grant a special permit limiting the exhibition of such pictures
... to persons over the age of twenty-one years....
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to adults; (2) the statutory standard was hopelessly indefinite; (3) the age limit
of twenty-one was unreasonable. In reflecting the test of the statute, i.e., effect
upon those under twenty-one, Judge Sullivan, speaking for the court, declared:
Assuming for the moment (without deciding) that the words "obscene
and immoral" have a definite and clear meaning, it is apparent that they
express absolute concepts. A picture is either "obscene" ("offensive to
taste; foul; loathsome") or it is not. And this is true of the other standards
mentioned in section 155-4. For example, a picture either does or does
not "portray lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or
religion." None of these criteria can change with the age of the beholder.
To say, as the Ordinance does, that a thing may be "immoral" so far as
one group of persons is concerned does violence to the English language.
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The decision appears open to immediate criticism because of its hasty rejection
of limited censorship. As has been indicated above, neither Roth nor Butler fore-
closed such a possibility, and Butler contained implications that such censorship
would be held constitutional. Furthermore, at least the American Law Institute,
which has on several occasions been cited with approval by the Supreme Court
in obscenity cases, 68 does not seem to agree with Judge Sullivan that it is so "ap-
parent" that the word obscenity expresses an "absolute concept," and that any
variation in meaning for different age groups "does violence to the English lan-
guage. '69 The need for special protection for minors especially in regard to motion
pictures, as well as the legal basis therefor, has been incisively analyzed elsewhere. 70
Another major question which has arisen in regard to the application of the
Roth definition of obscenity is: "Who shall decide what is and what is not obscene?"
The Supreme Court has not directly ruled upon this question. It has, however,
reversed per curiam several recent decisions from the Courts of Appeals in which
findings of obscenity has been sustained.71 It is possible to conclude that some of
these reversals resulted from a review of the facts by the Supreme Court and an
original finding by that Court that the material involved was not obscene. 72 This
would be consistent with opinions expressed elsewhere by Mr. Justice Frankfurter73
and Mr. Justice Harlan.7 4 On the other hand, such an approach has been criticized.
67 172 F. Supp. at 71.
68 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
69 See A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE, § 207.10(2) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957).
Obscenity shall be judged with reference to ordinary adults, except that it
shall be judged with reference to children or other specially susceptible
audience if it appears from the circumstances of its dissemination to be
specially designed for or directed to such an audience."
See also United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. N.Y. 1957), where the
court held that material which was concededly obscene under the average man test was
not obscene when the recipient was the Kinsey Institute for Sex Research.
70 Note, "For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental Film Censorship by
Age Classification," 69 Yale L.J. 141 (1959). The article concludes that "if the ultimate
purpose of banning 'obscene' material is the protection of society from its influence, obscenity
should depend upon the susceptibility of the exposed group." Id. at 145.
71 Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957); Mounce v. United States, 355
U.S. 180 (1957), vacating 247 F.2d 148, (9th Cir. 1957) which reversed 4 N.Y.2d 349;
One, Incorporated v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing 241 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1957);
Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing 249 F.2d 114 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
72 See 26 U. CmI. L. REv. 309 for a discussion of the possible reasons for the reversals
of these cases.
73 See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the "Lady Chatterley's
Lover" movie case, approving such an "instance by-instance, case-by-case" approach. Kingsley
Int. Pic. Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 696-97 (1959).
74 The suppression of a particular writing or other tangible form of expression
is, therefore, an individual matter, and in the nature of things every such
suppression raises an individual constitutional problem, in which a reviewing
court must determine for itself whether the attacked expression is suppress-
able within constitutional standards. Since these standards do not readily
lend themselves to generalized definitions, the constitutional problem in
the last analysis becomes one of particularized judgments which appellate
courts must make for themselves.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In agreeing to strike down New York's ban on the movie "Lady Chatterley's
Lover," Mr. Justice Black remarked:
I .. . but add a few words because of concurring opinions by several
Justices who rely on their appraisal of the movie ... for holding that New
York cannot constitutionally ban it .... If despite the Constitution [Black
would strike down all prior censorship of movies] ... this nation is to
embark on the dangerous road of censorship, my belief is that this Court is
about the most inappropriate Supreme Board of Censors that could be
found.75
Mr. Justice Harlan in the Roth case would have struck down the federal obscenity
statute, as applied, because of the inappropriateness of a single uniform application
of the obscenity test for the Nation. He warned that "The prerogative of the
States to differ on their ideas of morality will be destroyed, the ability of States to
experiment will be stunted.' And Mr. Justice Brennan has declared that in these
cases the question of obscenity should be submitted to the jury. He reasons:
The jury represents a cross-section of the community and has a special
aptitude for reflecting the view of the average person. Jury trial of obscenity
therefore provides a peculiarly competent application of the standard for
judging obscenity which, by its definition, calls for an appraisal of material
according to the average person's application of contemporary community
standards.7 6
Conclusion
As the preceding section has indicated, only material with the legal definition
of obscenity can and should be controlled by governmental action. Such action is
justified by the interest of the state in public morality Yet the Supreme Court has
held that the State interest in morality does not permit it to suppress the advocacy
of immoral ideas, the presentation of which cannot be characterized as "prurient,"
a decision probably justified as a safeguard upon the rights of free speech. But,
in regard to certain impressionable segments of the population, especially children
a program of limited censorship, it is submitted, is completely in order.
Such limited control is as far as the state may go under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. For those who desire to place greater limitations upon the
action of publishers and distributors of books and pictures, and producers and
distributors of motion pictures, the answer lies in the formation of and adherence
to vocal private groups and a non-governmental design to build up public senti-
ment against morally objectionable displays and publications. With this as an
objective such organizations as the Legion of Decency, the National Organization
for Decent Literature, and the Churchmen's Commission for Decent Publications
will continue to serve a worthwhile function by promoting discipline and restraint
in the choice of reading material and motion pictures.
Lawrence James Bradley
Joseph A. Marino
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497 (1957) (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
75 Kingsley Int. Pic. Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 690 (1959).
76 Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 448 (1957) (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice
Brennan's position was rejected by the majority of the Court.
77 A disposition in this direction has been recognized, at least on the administrative level.
See Manual Enterprises, Inc., Post Office Dept. No. 1/246 (28 April 1960), 28 U.S.L. WEEK
2570 (May 17, 1960). The department's order, barring from the mails a magazine for
homosexuals, seems to have relied more on the emotional reaction of the rather small group
to whom the magazine was directed than to the average man in the community.
